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A DIFFERENT BLACK VOICE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
LLOYD COHEN*

I. INTRODUCTION
The standards of achievement in law are eclectic, subjective, and ad
hoe. This observation is offered as a positive assessment rather than a
normative criticism. Such standards are all that one should rightly expect
of a discipline that takes as its subject a creation of the mysterious human
spirit and as its purpose to channel man's changing social, political, and
economic relations through the authority of an evolving state. But,
regardless of their honorable origins, the fuzzy standards of excellence in
law mean that those of us who toil in the field have great difficulty
distinguishing the brilliant from the pretentious and the workmanlike from
the dull. In fact, this difficulty is greater for legal scholars than for
scholars in harder disciplines such as mathematics and physics whose
subjects are either purely analytical or God's rational immutable physical
laws. While an earlier and more confident breed of intellectual sailors may
have been able to navigate this legal sea without a steady deck beneath
their feet, our generation seems to have lost its bearings and is without a
compass to point towards the legitimate and informative realm of legal
scholarship. As a result, our intellectual world has become a strange
congeries of the traditional and solid, the innovative and exciting, and
some of the most vacuous, puerile ravings.
A. Judging Black Legal Scholarship
The problem of judging achievement has become particularly acute in
those areas of legal scholarship that are insulated from outside review and
critical appraisal. One such area is the emerging category sometimes
referred to as minority, or black, jurisprudence. Prudent mainstream
scholars have given minority jurisprudence a wide berth because they
believe that the more subjective nature of quality judgments in the legal
literature leaves them vulnerable to charges that any criticism they offer
is motivated by racism or some other invidious form of discrimination.
Consequently, minority jurisprudence has become an academic ghetto in
which the quality of intellectual discourse is suspect and where mainstream
scholars tread at the risk of being declared out of bounds or worse.
* Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Funding for this research was
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B. Kennedy Arrives
Perhaps this situation is beginning to change. In the Summer of 1989
a young black Harvard professor, Randall Kennedy, published as lead
article in the HarvardLaw Review a powerful critique of a main branch
of this school of minority jurisprudence. 1 Kennedy's article is an attack
on the scholarship and rhetorical posture of three members of the
fraternity, Professors Derrick Bell,2 Richard Delgado,3 and Marl
Matsuda.4 These authors do not, of course, exhaust the field, but
Professor Kennedy wisely chose to limit his critique to detailed
examinations of representative works that exemplify the sins against which
he preaches.'
1. See Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1745 (1989).
2. The principal works of Professor Bell discussed by Kennedy are: DERRICK BELL,
The Unspoken Limit on Affirmative Action: The Chronicle ofthe DeVine Gift, in AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED 140-61 (1987); Derrick Bell, Application of the 'Tipping Point'
Principle to Law Facuy Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA L.J. 319 (1986); Derrick Bell, A
Question of Credentials, HARV. L. REC., Sept. 17, 1982, at 14; Derrick Bell, Bakke:
MinorityAdmissions, andthe UsualPrice ofRacialRemedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1979)
[hereinafter Bell, Bakke]; Derrick Bell, Minority Admissions as a White Debate, in RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 7.12.1 (2d ed. 1980); Derrick Bell, Strangers in
Academic Paradise:Law Teachers of Color in Still White Law Schools, 20 U.S.F. L.
REV. 385 (1986).
3. The principal works of Professor Delgado discussed by Kennedy are: Richard
Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987); Richard Delgado, The Author Replies,
3 LAW & INEQ. J. 261 (1985) (responding to criticism of The Imperial Scholar); Richard
Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Delgado, The Imperial Scholar].
4. The principal works of Professor Matsuda discussed by Kennedy are: Mari
Matsuda, Affirmative Action andLegalKnowledge: PlantingSeeds in Plowed-Up Ground,
11 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1988); Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal
Studies andReparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) [hereinafter Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom].
5. Works by other authors of the minority jurisprudence school that Professor
Kennedy mentions but does not discuss in detail are: Jose A. Braccamonte, Minority
Critiques of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement: Foreword, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 297 (1987); Roy L. Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel
Process, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (1987); Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation andLegitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331 (1988); Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 435 (1987); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of
Opportunity, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988); Andrew W. Haines, Minority
Law Professorsand the Myth of Sisyphus: Consciousnessand Praxis Within the Special

19921

A DIFFERENT BLACK VOICE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

The criticized works argue for two related propositions. "The
first-the exclusion thesis-is the belief that the intellectual contributions
of scholars of color are wrongfully ignored or undervalued."6 The
second-the racial distinctiveness thesis-is the belief that minority
scholars, because of their racial status, as a matter of first principles have
a unique and privileged perspective from which to comment on legal
issues.
Professor Kennedy finds that Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda "fail to
support persuasively their claims of racial exclusion or their claims that
legal academic scholars of color produce a racially distinctive brand of
valuable scholarship."' In addition, and perhaps more important for the
future of legal scholarship, Kennedy
also take[s] issue with their politics of argumentation and with
some of the normative premises underlying their writings . . .
[S]pecifically [he] challenge[s]: (1) the argument that, on
intellectual grounds, white academics are entitled to less
"standing" to participate in race-relations law discourse than
academics of color; (2) the argument that, on intellectual grounds,
the minority status of academics of color should serve as a
positive credential for purposes of evaluating their work; [and] (3)
explanations that assign responsibility for the current position of
scholars of color overwhelmingly to the influence of prejudiced
decisions by white academics. 9
C. Kennedy's Targets Strike Back
Professor Kennedy's opponents have not allowed this attack to pass
in silence. Their reactions and responses are encapsulated in a summary
Teaching Challenge in American Law Schools, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 247 (1988);
Charles R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiringin AALS Law Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 429
(1986); Charles R. Lawrence II, The Id, The Ego, andEqual Protection:Reckoning with
UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious
Racism]; Henry W. McGee, Symbol and Substancein the Minority Professoriat's Future,
3 HARV. BLACKLErrERJ. 67 (1986); Kellis E. Parker, Ideas, Affirmative Action and the
Ideal University, 10 NOVA L.J. 761 (1986); Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of
Property, 14 SIGNs 5 (1988).
6. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1745-46 (footnote omitted).
7. Id.at 1746.
8. Id. at 1749.
9. ld.
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of the debate authored by Jon Wiener, a historian at the University of
California at Irvine." ° To Richard Delgado,
[t]he debate is about voice . . . about making everybody speak
one language. Certain cries of pain lose a lot in the translation.
The whole idea of a dominant legal discourse is to limit the range
of what you can express, the range of argument you can make.
It requires that everything be buttressed by authority, by looking
to the past. What happens in the law reviews is important because
they are the perfect place to explore a broadening of the dominant
discourse. For Kennedy to take us to task for urging
experimentation with and broadening of that discourse is
singularly unfair. 1
Another member of the minority jurisprudence school, Patricia Williams,
dismisses Kennedy's article as
a representative response from the academy to new black voices.
He is saying "Prove that racism exists." I'm not going to do that.
I take American history as given, and work with the results. In
the ideology of legal style this is called "unscholarly"-especially
if it's done in the first person12
And, Derrick Bell in a letter to the editor of The New York Times
says, "[Y]ou report that Randall Kennedy . . . touched off a 'rancorous
debate' by daring to ... question[] the scholarly merit of minority legal
scholars whose writings use personal narrative and fictional techniques to
advance arguments about the pervasive role of racism in American
law."13 Bell then takes The Times to task for overstating and
mischaracterizing the rancor of the debate, but not for the attribution of
its cause to a criticism by Kennedy of the use of personal narrative and

fiction."Y
What are we to make of this dispute between Kennedy and his
target/critics? Their conflict is over more than whether minority scholars
are discriminated against and whether they have some particularly
trenchant things to say. Its less parochial theme is a disagreement over
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fightthe Power, NATION, Sept. 4/11, 1989, at 246.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 247.
Derrick Bell, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1990, at A14 (letter to editor).
See id.
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who may participate in such arguments and how they are to be conducted
and decided.
Is there something peculiar about minority legal thought such that it
can only, or at best, be communicated using allegory and personal history?
Are such rhetorical devices suspect or impermissible in legal scholarship?
Is it these rhetorical devices to which Kennedy objects? Can scholarship
that employs these devices be judged by the usual standards? Or, is some
sort of esoteric knowledge-only acquired by an accident of birth or
upbringing-required to judge these arguments? To address these questions
and to introduce the dispute, I briefly restate some of Kennedy's
arguments and those of his targets.
II.

WHITHER THE SEPARATE VOICE

Richard Delgado, Patricia Williams, and Derrick Bell are descriptively
correct in their characterization of the different rhetorical style of minority
scholars. Many of the minority jurisprudence school employ a somewhat
different style of discourse. Bell and Williams"5 use allegories and other
fictional tales in their writings, and a number of minority scholars,
Williams in particular, recite their personal or family history and use that
history as a text for legal interpretation. It is the use of these different
rhetorical devices that constitute the style, if not the substance, of the
distinctive black "voice" in legal scholarship.
A. Mari Matsuda: Recognizing and Honoring the Separate Voice
Mar Matsuda is a fan of the distinctive black voice. She believes that
"[t]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special voice
to which we should listen,"16 and that "[t]he victims of racial oppression
have distinctive normative insights."' 7 In her articles, she offers
examples of what she believes is that "special voice" 8 and are those
"distinctive insights." 9
Matsuda's arguments about the separate, distinctive voice of minority
scholars, and Kennedy's response, are less important for the evidence that
they marshal, than for their respective epistemic assumptions and
standards that form the main axis of the dispute between Kennedy and all
15. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From
DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
16.
17.
18.
19.

Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 4, at 324.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 324.
Id.
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of his targets and critics. Although Professor Matsuda was but one of the
three main targets of Kennedy's article, it was her argument about the
existence and virtue of a separate voice that was taken by all of Kennedy's
critics as central to the dispute?0
I shall not recapitulate in detail Professor Kennedy's counterarguments
and evidence. Suffice it to say, he finds Matsuda's argument and examples
unconvincing because they are drawn almost exclusively from outside the
legal arena, inapposite.21 Drawing on the works of both black and white
legal academics, Kennedy argues that all black scholars do not speak with
a single voice nor are their ideas or reasoning distinct from white
scholars.22
But beyond this criticism, it is the spiritually degrading character of
Matsuda's argument that Kennedy finds most offensive. Professor
Kennedy's
central objection to the claim of racial distinctiveness propounded
by Professor Matsuda and others of like mind can best be
summarized by observing that it stereotypes scholars. By
stereotyping I mean the process whereby the particularity of an
individual's characteristics are denied by reference to the
perceived characteristics of the racial group with which the
individual is associated.'
Matsuda, Delgado, Williams, Bell, and those who argue that there is
something special about minority legal scholarship believe that it is not
merely different in subject matter, but that it is different in voice. They
believe that this different voice must be attended to and judged in a
fundamentally different way and that the traditional standards for
evaluating legal scholarship are illegitimate when applied to minority
jurisprudence. Matsuda believes that legal scholars "need to develop 'new
skills of listening' to learn about minorities' experiences: 'The voices
bringing new knowledge are sometimes faint and self-effacing, other times
brash and discordant ....We should strive to understand their origin and
listen carefully for the truth they may hide.'" ' Kennedy, in contrast,
would hold up Matsuda's work and those of other members of her school
to the traditional standards of good scholarship.'
20. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
21. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1779.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id. at 1778-87.
Id. at 1786-87.
Wiener, supra note 10, at 248.
This discussion of a separate and privileged voice for black scholars that need
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B. Enlarging or Abandoning Standards?
Kennedy's critics believe that the intellectual enterprise -may become

stunted and stultified by a quasi-theological adherence to inappropriate and
overly restrictive methodologies of argument. And I, for one, could not

agree more. On the other hand, I am compelled to note that their position
is neither original, nor peculiar to law. In economics, for example,
thoughtful scholars have argued that the laudable desire to raise the true
and perceived status of the discipline to a science has led to the adoption

of, and an exaggerated faith in, the so-called scientific method borrowed
from nineteenth-century physics.' In law, economics, and every other
intellectual discipline, the nature and limits of proper argument are neither
simple nor sharply defined. And, whatever those limits are, they are not
identical across disciplines. Proper argument has its bounds, and those
not meet the traditional criteria of academic scholarship has a familiar ring to it. It was
barely two decades ago that black-studies programs began to blossom on college
campuses. Thomas Sowell writes of such programs:
Questions of academic qualifications are dismissed rather than discussed.
Quality standards are equated with being "white-like." Such arguments are
typically long in colorful characterizations-"academic colonizers,"
"institutional racism," "house niggers"-and short on specific systematic
empirical tests of specific hypotheses. Indeed these very processes of
hypotheses-testing are rejected. These rejections are often characterized as
"methodological" differences, when in fact they are differences in socialpolitical preconceptions. The very tools of intellectual inquiry are declared to
be "conservative tools," and the black intellectual is said to add "something
extra." But what this something might be is left undefined: "Writing at the
beginning of the development of Black Social Science, one can say only what
it might become. The black scholar must use 'his sense of Black consciousness
as the cutting edge to redefine reality.'"
THOMAS SOWELL, EDUCATION ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORY 147 (1986).

26. See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 481 (1983):

Nothing is gained from clinging to the Scientific Method, or to any
methodology except honesty, clarity, and tolerance. Nothing is gained because
the methodology does not describe the sciences it was once thought to
describe, such as physics or mathematics; and because physics and
mathematics are not good models for economics anyway; and because the
methodology is now seen by many philosophers themselves to be
uncompelling; and because economic science would stop progressing if the
methodology were in fact used; and, most important, because economics, like
any field, should get its standards of argument from itself, not from the
legislation of philosopher kings.
Id. at 482.
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bounds must be decided by a more general argument about what persuades
honest, intelligent scholars within the field.
Professor Kennedy does not directly speak to the question of the
validity of the various rhetorical devices favored by the minority
jurisprudence school. I infer from his article that he takes the position of
all thoughtful and honest scholars that the issue is not one of rhetorical
style but rather whether a particular argument is persuasive and powerful.
The standards properly brought to bear in making such a judgment need
not be confined by a narrow methodology. And, many different forms of
scholarly discourse are acceptable. But, such openness does not mean that
no standards apply. The arguments of minority scholars must meet the test
of sound and persuasive argument. As for the rarefied meta-argument that
minority scholarship cannot be judged on the basis of traditional
methodologies, that argument, too, cannot escape the tests of soundness
and persuasiveness. The reader is always permitted, indeed obligated, to
ask whether' the writer makes a good case for his position. As an
operational matter, this can translate tO questions such as: Does the author
marshal and explain the available evidence?; Is the argument logically
tight?; Are alternate views adequately addressed and countered?'
Let us now turn to the rhetorical style and arguments of two of
Kennedy's targets, Richard Delgado and Derrick Bell, and those of a
writer Kennedy mentions only in passing, Charles Lawrence III, to
address three questions: (1) how persuasive are their arguments?; (2) do
these prominent minority scholars, as representatives of their genre, speak
with a distinctive voice that employs unique rhetorical devices?; and (3)
if so, does that voice grant the speakers some special standing in the great
legal conversation?
27. Stephen Carter, another prominent black legal scholar, voicing the same theme
has written:
Scholarship is scholarship, and the quality of a piece of scholarly work doesn't

turn on race-specific factors. It doesn't turn on voice. It turns on demonstrated
mastery of the relevant material and the ability to contribute to a dialogue, or
to spark a new one. It turns on saying something that not only is not in the
prior literature, but is not obvious in light of the prior literature. It turns,
further, on making a logical argument-not a correct one, necessarily, or even
a non-controversial one, but certainly one that is coherent. And it turns on
setting out fairly the possible objections and dealing with them, or even noting,
when appropriate, the extent to which they successfully limit one's own
position.
Stephen Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, 1 RECONSTRUCTION 6, 29 (1990).
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C. Richard Delgado: What Voice?
Richard Delgado has written that racial prejudice exists in the
allocation of scholarly recognition. "Delgado charges that the leading

white commentators on race-relations law comprise a cadre of 'imperial
scholars' who have occupied central areas of civil rights scholarship and
have systematically excluded or minimized the participation of minority
academics."' While he rejects as explanations both "conscious

malevolence and crass indifference," 29 "he posits that the imperial
scholars' exclusionary conduct is mainly unconscious and prompted by the

desire to maintain control, to prevent scholarly criticism from becoming
too threatening to the academic and political status quo."' This charge
is both serious and highly dubious.3 1 Such allegations should be well
supported before being used, lest one tar someone with undeserved

obloquy and leave oneself open to charges of malice or incompetence.
From a methodological perspective, Professor Delgado's argument is

standard academic fare. He is not making some rarefied meta-observation
about the world. He is simply saying that certain named scholars, in

certain particular articles, fail to cite and to acknowledge works that they
should.32 Whatever rhetorical or epistemic need there may be for

minority scholars to use a different voice, it is surely not here. While
Delgado's psychological explanation of why the "imperial scholars" have

excluded minorities from their ranks may be beyond proof and subject to
only the lesser standard of plausible conjecture, this lower standard cannot

apply to the charge of invidious racial exclusion itself. That charge is
subject to proof or at least persuasive argument supported by empirical

evidence.
28. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1770-71.
29. Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 3, at 574.
30. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1771 (citing Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra
note 3 at 573-76).
31. I am not alone in my primafacie skepticism of Delgado's hypothesis. Stephen
Carter has written:
To imagine that considerations of race motivate the [choice of which articles
to cite], however, one must also imagine that the authors of this mainstream
literature are sufficiently familiar with their colleagues at other institutions that
they are able to tell which are white and which are not. While that may be a
fair description of some scholars in some fields, it is my admittedly anecdotal
experience that this is not generally so.
Carter, supra note 27, at 30.
32. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 3, at 562-63 (stating that the
select group of professorswho publish important civil-rights articles fails to cite minority
authors for legal as well as nonlegal propositions and assertions of fact).
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Delgado seems to recognize that no peculiar voice or unusual brand
of scholarship is required to make his case. He does not eschew empirical
evidence. Indeed, his article examines the citation pattern in twenty-eight33
civil-rights articles by half a dozen leading liberal white law professors.
Delgado finds that they habitually cite one another and virtually never cite
the works of minority scholars.' How persuasive is such evidence? As
Kennedy points out, revealing the citation pattern in the faulted articles is
only the first step in a persuasive argument. Delgado's main task was to
point to works by scholars of color and demonstrate that they have been
wrongfully neglected.'
What makes the failure to cite or to reference a work suspect?
Perhaps, it was seminal, or particularly eloquent, or more tightly
reasoned, or presented unique or at least new evidence. Delgado had to
show that given the subject matter of the articles he faults, the scholarship
by authors of color would have been the natural substitute or supplemental
reference to the ones chosen by the "imperial scholar."
If there is substance to Delgado's charge, he should offer some real
proof. This task, while requiring some time and care, need tax neither the
budget nor the analytical faculty of a capable scholar. Kennedy points out
that similar charges of racial exclusion have been made by historians.'
Those historians provided detailed explanations of what important insights
and research offered by black scholars were wrongly ignored by white
academics writing on the same subjects." Professor Kennedy discusses
"The Imperial Scholars" in some detail and argues that Delgado tells the
reader little or nothing about the works he believes have been wrongly
neglected for racial reasons.3" There is some irony in the fact that
33. See id. at 562-63.
34. See id. at 563.
35. See Kennedy, supranote 1, at 1774 (citing works by or about W.E.B. DuBois,
a black historian; Kenneth Clark, a black psychologist and past president of the American
Psychological Association; Martin Luther King, Jr.; Cesar Chavez; Malcolm X, and

others).
36. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1774.

37. See id. at 1774 n.123 ("A considerable amount of revisionist writing on AfroAmerican history published by white historians in the forties, fifties, and sixties derived
part of its perceived 'originality' from an institutionalized ignorance of earlier work
produced by black historians, much of it published in The Journalof Negro History."
[citation omitted]); AUGUST MEmR & ELLIOT RUDWICK, BLACK HISTORY AND THE
HISTORICAL PROFESSION, 1915-1980 (1986); Michael R. Winston, Through the Back
Door:Academic Racism and the Negro Scholarin HistoricalPerspective, 100 DAEDELUS
678 (1971).
38. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1774 (stating that "Delgado fails to shoulder the
essential burdens of championing on substantive grounds specific works that deserve
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Kennedy makes his case against Delgado using the very methods that
Professor Delgado should have used to substantiate his own more serious
charge of invidious racism on the part of respected legal scholars.39
D. Derrick Bell: The Uses of Fiction
Derrick Bell is arguably the most prominent member of the black
jurisprudence movement.' Bell's most well known work is the 1987
book And We Are Not Saved.4 The format of the book is a series of
discussions between Bell and a character of his invention, the young,
beautiful, brilliant, radical, black law professor Geneva Crenshaw. Each
discussion uses as its text a highly stylized fictional tale dealing with some
aspect of black life.
Professor Kennedy, in his article, focuses on one of Bell's scenarios,
"The Chronicle of the DeVine Gift." 42 Bell hypothesizes that Ms.
more recognition than they have been given").
39. See generally id. at 1770-78 (evaluating the merits of Delgado's claim using
specific examples).
40. Professor Bell was made a full professor at Harvard Law School in 1971 and,
except for a five-year stint (1980-1985) as dean of the University of Oregon Law School,
held that position for many years. In 1992 he served as a visiting professor at New York
University School of Law and is currently a senior associate scholar at New York
University. Professor Bell has been a very visible figure in the law-school world. For
several years, he actively and publicly campaigned for more minority and female
appointments to the Harvard Law School faculty. In the fall of 1990, he took a leave of
absence from Harvard protesting its failure to appoint a tenured minority woman. Several
years ago, he was also the focus of a public controversy at Stanford Law School.
Stanford's Dean, Paul Brest, recounts the incident as follows:
In the Spring of 1986, Derrick Bell was a visitor at Stanford Law School,
where he taught an introductory course in Constitutional Law. Professor Bell
was the former Dean of the University of Oregon Law School, and he teaches
at Harvard Law School. He is a prominent legal scholar. He is also black.
Students in Prof. Bell's class criticized his teaching and complained that
they were unable to learn the subject from him. Many began auditing other
instructors' constitutional law classes. These events ultimately led to the idea
of a series of public lectures in basic constitutional law to be given by various
faculty members. Although these lectures would be open to the student body
as a whole, their unstated purpose was to offer Prof. Bell's students a
supplement to his course. The series was called off after members of the Black
Law Students Association protested the first lecture on the ground that both the
students' dissatisfaction and the unprecedented lecture series were tainted by
racism.
Statement of Dean Paul Brest, Stanford University Campus Report, Dec. 2, 1987, at 15.
41. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2.
42. Id. at 140.
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Crenshaw, while teaching at an elite law school, has been instrumental in
recruiting five additional highly qualified "minority" law professors, three
of whom are black. When another black candidate, more outstanding than
the others, becomes available, the dean of the law school refuses to hire
him because it would make the faculty twenty-five-percent minority and
thus fundamentally change its identity as a mainstream white law
school. 43
What is one to make of Bell's story? Does he think that white law
professors are refusing to hire blacks because they fear being
overwhelmed and isolated at their own schools? Or is his argument more
subtle? Perhaps he believes that although liberal law professors are now
eager to hire blacks, that posture will last only as long as the numbers are
not threatening, and that if the qualifications of blacks markedly improved,
whites would show their true racist colors. Whether Bell is trying to make
this or some other point remains obscure even after repeated readings of
his infelicitous essay.
In his introduction to the book, however, Bell writes that:
affirmative action, a contemporary policy intended to compensate
for the damaging effects of past racial discrimination, is examined
in the Chronicle of the DeVine Gift. The frequent complaint that
"we can't find qualified blacks" may be proof that the
affirmative-action policy is serving its real, though
unacknowledged, goal: excluding all but a token number of
minorities from opportunities that previously were available only
to whites."
As I understand it, Professor Bell believes that, under the guise of
affirmative action, many law schools are engaged in a massive suppression
of black academic prospects. If he is correct, Bell has made a brilliant
discovery. The widely held view, however, of those who have seen lawschool hiring practices from the inside is the opposite. Most law
professors believe that black applicants with weaker credentials will be
given extensive consideration and often job offers in circumstances in
which white lawyers, males in particular, with stronger credentials by all
the standard criteria of grades, LSATs, law-review experience,
publications, and clerkships, will not be given a second look.'
43. id. at 143.
44. See id. at 8.

45. "The fact is that law schools, particularly leading law schools, actively pursue,
hire, and grant tenure to blacks who would not be given a moment's consideration if they
were white." Lino A. Graglia, Book Review, 5 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 436, 446-47
(1988) (reviewing THOMAS R. SOWELL, COMPASSION VERSUS GUILT AND OTHER
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Does Professor Bell offer any evidence or argument to support his
position? All that either Randall Kennedy or I could find on point was a
passing reference to the notion that the standard criteria are either too
narrow or invidiously discriminatory.' Bell would apparently like to give
relatively greater weight in faculty hiring decisions to success in practice.
This alternative or supplementary criterion is not without some theoretical
appeal. Its shortcoming-and perhaps its unspoken appeal to Bell-is
operational.
How does one measure success in practice? The best law students do
not go into solo practice. In large firm practice, most of one's work
product is not visible to outsiders. In addition, the work product that is
visible is usually a joint effort, and individual marginal product therefore
remains largely unmeasurable. Nor can appointment committees rely on
letters of recommendation. Such letters are of some value when the reader
knows the writer, has reason to trust his judgment and character, and has
no reason to suspect any conflict of interest. Letters from practitioners
meet these conditions less often than those from academics. There is a
small village of academics writing letters of recommendation; the reader
will usually know the writer, at least by reputation. There is a vast
metropolis of practitioners; the writer will usually be unknown to the
reader. In addition, academics are repeat players in the recommendation
market and must try to preserve their reputation for honesty and good
judgment. During the course of their careers they will recommend many
former students for teaching positions. Practitioners, on the other hand,
are rarely called on for such letters and are usually recommending current
employees. Thus, they have little interest in protecting their reputation and
may have mixed motives in writing a glowing recommendation.
But this is a mere aside. In two paragraphs, I have spilled
considerably more ink discussing the question of whether to use success
in practice to judge potential candidates than does Bell. The central
message of Professor Bell's opaque story seems to be the assertion, rather
than the argument, that, despite all the evidence including his readers'
personal experience to the contrary, law schools are invidiously
discriminating against blacks in hiring.
Is there something questionable about Professor Bell's rhetoricaldevices as distinct from the quality of his argument? No! The question is
not whether the slightly unusual device of allegory is legitimate-it is. Nor
is the question whether a scholar who, on account of cultural background
or individual character and style, feels comfortable expressing himself in
this mode ought to do so-he should. The real question is purely and
ESSAYS (1987); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987)).
46. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 143, 156-57.
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simply whether a given allegory effectively illuminates the question at
hand.
Nor is the use of allegory to illustrate legal problems and propositions
far outside the traditional orbit of legal rhetoric. One of the most esteemed
works of Lon Fuller, a giant in the history of American jurisprudence, is
just such an allegory. The Case of the Speluncean Explorers' is an
account of how an archetypical set of judges would respond to the crime
of murder and cannibalism by men who otherwise would have died
trapped in a cave. What makes the device so powerful is that Fuller is able
to set up a problem that unambiguously captures the salient legal and
moral difficulties and then faithfully present the arguments that would be
offered by five judges, each representing a different and reasonably
appealing legal philosophy."
Derrick Bell's allegory of a black faculty candidate who is not offered
a faculty appointment fails, not because it is fictional in the literary
sense,49 but rather because it is false in ludicrously failing to come to
grips with the salient problem that there' are not enough qualified black
candidates to fill even five percent of the slots, let alone twenty-five
percent.' His strikingly counterintuitive and undocumented charge that
affirmative action is in reality a subtle trick for excluding qualified
minorities from law teaching cries out for powerful substantiation. Instead,
we get a tale about a fictional school. In this particular case, allegory is
being used as a means of ducking the inevitable scholarly responsibility of
backing up one's charges with evidence. No amount of scholarly sympathy
to new styles or "voices"-and we could use a lot more-would make
Bell's essay even a jot more convincing. This is because the problems are
not with his voice; rather, they are problems that trip up scholars of all
kinds of voices: poor argument and lack of evidence.
47. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616
(1949).
48. Id.
49. Many great works of literature, including Antigone, The Trial, The Merchant
of Venice, Billy Budd, and Bleak House, prominently feature legal themes. See RICHARD
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (1988).
50. Of the applicants for admission to law school in 1987 with LSAT scores
between 42 and 45, and between 46 and 48, less than one percent were black. When
undergraduate grade point average is also considered, the percentage of black students
falling into the elite category declines further. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION SERVICE,
ACCESS 2000 DATA BOOK: U.S. MINORITY EDUCATIONAL ENROLLMENT 47 (1988). In

addition, few blacks performed at the elite level after being admitted to law school. A
study of 10 leading law schools revealed that the median grade of their black students
was at the eighth percentile. ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSINo ELITES 162 (1985). It is
primarily from the set of the most successful students at the most selective law schools
that future law professors are chosen.
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E. The Use of PersonalHistory
In addition to allegories, another literary device favored by the
minority jurisprudence school is the use of personal or family experience
as the text for interpretation and argument.5 1 Is this an illegitimate
rhetorical technique in legal scholarship? I do not believe so. Much good

and great writing has been of an exquisitely personal nature; consider
52
Augustine's Confessions

or Proust's Remembrance of Things Past.53

The skeptical reader might respond that neither of these works is legal

scholarship. But even within the legal literature, the essay from the
personal perspective is not anomalous. When a leading figure in the law
retires or dies, there is the traditional set of remembrance articles in which

the authors delve into both their own and the subject's personal history.'

This is part of the more general category of biography and autobiography,
a clearly legitimate avenue of legal scholarship.55
Biography or autobiography, however, is not the only vehicle for the
discussion of personal experience in a work about law. I confess to having
made use of it in my own writing. For example, in discussing the effect

of higher divorce rates on women's career choices, I wrote that "[tihe fact
that, unlike their grandmother, my daughters will not be told that in order

51. Patricia Williams, for example, has achieved some notoriety recounting her
family experience as the object of racism. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, On Being the
Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988) ("For some time I have been writing about my
great-great-grandmother. I have considered the significance of her history and that of
slavery from a variety of viewpoints on a variety of occasions: in every speech, in every
conversation, even in my commercial transactions class."). Professor Williams's greatgreat-grandmother Sophie, a slave, was impregnated at the age of 12 by her owner,
Austin Miller, a Tennessee lawyer. Id. at 6.
52. AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE (Edward Pisey, trans.,

1949).
53.

MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST (1954).

54. See, e.g., the following set of articles commemorating the retirement of
Professor Walter Blum from the faculty of the University of Chicago Law School:
Marvin A. Chirelstein, WalterJ.Blum and My Brilliant Career,55 U. CHI. L. REV. 725
(1988); Joseph Isenbergh, Walter Blum, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 734 (1988); Howard G.
Krane, Walter J. Blum and the University of Chicago Tax Conference, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 730 (1988); Geoffrey R. Stone, Wally, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 721 (1988), or those
written "InMemoriam" of PaulBator: Stephen Breyer, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1741 (1989);
Charles Fried, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1739 (1989); David L. Shapiro, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1737 (1989).
55. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, THE COURAoE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS, at jacket

(1988) ("Peter Irons' extraordinary book reveals the live faces behind the masks of
constitutional law; to read it is to understand the inner dynamic of laws outward
development."-Lawrence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School).
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'to change diapers you don't need a college degree' is at least in part a
reflection of the fact that their job changing diapers will be less secure
than was their grandmother's."' Then, at another point in the same
article, I reproduce my marriage vows.57 I chose to employ these
personal references because they provided a human touch to a literature
that, although about the all too human subject of marriage and divorce, is
of necessity written from a somewhat detached intellectual perspective.
The personal references to what my grandmother said to my mother, what
my wife said to me, and me to her, invited the reader to empathize with
the subject and, in that process, to recognize something general, perhaps
even universal, in the experience being related.
Law is a complicated, deep, and difficult human discipline. In its
grand scope, it defies complete human comprehension. It would hardly be
prudent to foreclose from discourse inquiries into individual lives,
including those of the author, to inform the study of law. If any scholars,
men or women, black or white, can use their experiences to add clarity or
force to an argument, more power to them.
For a number of minority jurisprudence school authors, however,
personal experience functions like an incantation recited to magically
endow the writer with special standing rather than as a device to make the
human impact of a legal regime more real to the reader. Seeking special
standing or authority is not necessarily an illegitimate rhetorical motive,
but in a modem intellectual discipline, authority and standing cannot be
acquired by magic. It must, instead, derive from the power of the author's
rhetoric. If his experience rings true, if his interpretation is enlightening,
and if the legal implications he argues for are persuasive, then the
discussion of the experience will add authority to the piece. How well
does the work of authors of the minority jurisprudence school meet this
test?
F. Charles R. Lawrence III: The Misuse of PersonalExperience
Let us consider the work of someone Kennedy does not discuss,
Charles R. Lawrence I. Professor Lawrence begins his article on
"Unconscious Racism" 58 by recounting two personal experiences that he
believes bear on the subject of the essay. To Professor Lawrence, these
experiences exemplify unconscious racism on the part of American whites.
Lawrence's first story is an account of his shock and hurt when he brought
his three-year-old daughter to nursery school and learned that one of her
56. Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,Divorce and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best
Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 295 n.62 (1987).
57. Id. at 272 n.10.
58. See Lawrence, UnconsciousRacism, supra note 5.
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classmates had brought his favorite book, Little Black Sambo,5 9 to school
for the teacher to read to the class. The incident reawakens longsuppressed painful memories of shame and embarrassment, memories of
Lawrence's kindergarten teacher-whom he describes as a "good, well
meaning person, "-reading an earlier edition of the same book to his
class. Professor Lawrence's second experience is being told by a white
liberal friend at Haverford College, "I don't think of you as a Negr. "6'
Often the author, who examines the actions of others with a
microscope to discover their hidden motives and beliefs, would be better
advised to turn that lens on himself. Such is the case, I believe, with
Professor Lawrence. The affection of his daughter's classmate for Little
Black Sambo and the comments by his college classmate do not reflect
racism, unconscious or otherwise, but Lawrence's imputing a racist
subplot to these experiences speaks volumes of the afflictions of his own
soul.
It is difficult for adults to appreciate children's literature. With the
passage of time we leave the consciousness of four-year-olds further and
further behind. But we must try to reassume that consciousness to
understand the powerful appeal of Little Black Sambo to a small child. The
story is about a young boy who uses his wits to escape being devoured by
tigers. He convinces four of them in turn to accept a different article of
his new clothing in lieu of eating him. A short while later when the tigers
meet and observe each other's sartorial splendor, they are overwhelmed
by jealousy and anger. After disrobing, they stalk one another around the
base of a tree, each seizing with his teeth the tail of the cat in front.
Sambo takes advantage of the tigers' preoccupation to ask if they would
mind if he took back his clothes. They do not respond, for to do so would
require them to open their mouths and release the captive tail. Hearing no
objection, Sambo recovers his clothes and departs. This further incenses
the tigers, and they try ever harder to devour one another. Their efforts
are futile. They race around the tree at such velocity that their image blurs
into a mass of yellow and they are magically transformed into a pool of
butter. Sambo's father chances upon the butter and brings it home. The
story ends with the family feasting on butter-rich pancakes prepared by
Sambo's mother.
59.

The original version of the book was HELEN BANNERMAN, THE STORY OF

LrrrLE BLACK SAMBO (1898). I was able to examine two versions of the book: (1)
HELEN BANNERMAN, LITTLE BLACK SAmvBO (Keith Ward illustrator, Whitman Publishing
Co. 1935); and (2) HELEN BANNERMAN, LrrrLEBLACK SAMBO (Eulalie illustrator, Platt
& Munk Publishers 1972, 1955, 1928, and 1925).
60. Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 5, at 318.
61. Id. at 318.
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What is this story about? Why does it have an appeal to children that
spans the decades? The theme of Little Black Sambo is not racist.6 2
Children do not view Sambo as a comical, derisive, evil, or repulsive
character; indeed they identify with him. Sambo and his world capture and
reflect the way children would like to see themselves and their world.

Small children feel vulnerable and at times helpless in a world that they
are coming to understand contains many perils and is ruled by laws of
causation that are both unsympathetic and impervious to their will.
Sambo's story is a wish-fulfillment fantasy in which children identify with
the hero. Sambo is the child who can through his wits escape seemingly
much-more powerful forces, the tigers. The image of the four tigers with
their jaws locked around one another's tails conveys another satisfying
symbolic representation of the world, the powerful and dangerous forces
of the world can be brought into perfect equipoise such that a small weak
62. It is far from clear what race is properly ascribed to Sambo. Several things all
lead the reader to conclude that Sambo is an African Negro: (1) the reference in the title'
to Sambo as black; (2) the fact that "Sambo" may be the corruption of a name in several
West African cultures and was a name and pejorative title applied to black males in this
country from the late 18th to the early 20th century; and (3) the illustrations in several
editions depicting Sambo and his parents with Negro facial features. On the other side
of the ledger, however, there is much to suggest that Sambo is an Indian boy. First,
tigers are indigenous to India not Africa. Second, in various editions, both oblique and
direct references are made to India. Finally, many Indians have very dark complexions
and in Britain are indeed frequently referred to as blacks with about as much chromatic
accuracy as when the term is applied to most American Blacks. I have been unable to
determine whether Sambo is a name, or the corruption of a name, in any of the 23 main
languages or 200 dialects of India.
The two editions of the story I examined (see supranote 59) not only differed from
one another in their treatment of Sambo's race, but each was also internally inconsistent.
In the Whitman edition, Sambo and his parents were illustrated with somewhat
exaggerated Negro features, and yet the butter into which the tigers were transformed
was referred to by the Hindi word "ghi." In the Platt & Munk edition, the story is
expressly placed in India, but Sambo and even more so his father are depicted with
Negro features, and yet his mother appears Indian, wears a sari, and is named Mama
Sari.
I am not the first to argue that The Story of Little Black Samibo has been unfairly
tarred and to note the mistaken identification of Sambo as an African Negro. Joseph
Boskin in an authoritative and unsympathetic work on the pejorative use of the term
"Sambo" writes,
The Story of Little Black Sanbo... was not in fact in the [derisive] "Sambo"
tradition. Its title has misled many a reader. The Indian youth is no buffoon;
on the contrary, he uses his wits to defeat the tigers. But the wording of the
title, as well as the illustrations in several editions, was in keeping with the
stereotypical pose.
JosEPH BosKIN, SAMBo 37-38 (Oxford 1986) (emphasis added).
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boy can pass by them with safety. 63 Finally, it is not malefic causality,
but rather beneficent magic that rules the world-tigers that would
consume us can in an instant be transformed into butter, which we may
then consume. This sort of story is common in children's literature and
movies. Consider, the recently popular Home Alone6' in which a small
boy on Christmas Eve comically, lightly, and successfully foils two
determined burglars. That the main theme of both stories is a child
confronting
and overcoming-sometimes
through magical
intercession-dangerous malevolent forces is hardly surprising. This theme
is also a central feature in children's fantasy play.'
Any racist association with the story is merely an historic and
linguistic accident. Because for many adults, white and black alike, the
name Sambo was a pejorative synecdoche for all blacks, the book bore a
racist taint by dint of its title. But this has nothing whatsoever to do
with racism, unconscious or otherwise, in the story or, more importantly
for Professor Lawrence's thesis, in children's love of it. Nor is it easy to
conjure up a racist motive, whether conscious or not, for parents to
choose the book for their child. Surely, dyed-in-the-wool racists would no
more purchase a book about brave and clever Black Sambo than would
Nazis tell their children stories of brave and clever Jewish Moishe who
outwitted bears in the forests of Byelorussia. Perhaps Professor Lawrence
could contrive some theory of how putatively racially enlightened liberals
might choose the book for their children out of some unconscious racist
motive, but I doubt that many readers would be persuaded by such a
theory; and more to the point, he did not make that case in his article.
Professor Lawrence's discussion of Little Black Sambo has struck a
chord in my consciousness, but not the one he intended. I too am a
member of a despised and persecuted minority. The Christian world has
not been kind to Jews. For me, as for many Jews, symbols of Christianity
such as the crucifix are the representation of anti-Semitism. At some point
in my life, I may have believed that Christians displayed these symbols to
proclaim their anti-Semitism. At times I still must remind myself that
although the crucifix may symbolize for me the oppression of Jews by
63. Much the same satisfying imagery is employed in slapstick comedy. I can recall
Charlie Chaplin, oblivious to two big fellows charging at him from opposite directions,
bending over to pick a flower thereby causing them to crash into one another.
64. HOME ALoNE (Twentieth Century Fox 1990).
65. For an enlightening discussion as well as a fascinating retelling of children's
fantasy play in which they confront and defeat evil and dangerous forces, see VIVLAN G.
PALEY, BAD GuYs DON'T HAVE BIRTHDAYS, at viii (1988) ("[Cihildreifuse fantasy play
to portray fear in order to prove that fear can be conquered: I pretend therefore I am not
afraid.").
66. BOSKIN, supra note 62, at 34-38.
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Christians, that is neither the conscious nor unconscious meaning of it for
the vast majority of those who display it. It seems to me that Professor
Lawrence has failed to distinguish between what he sees in a work of
literature and what it means to others. To Lawrence, Sambo is the ugly
black primitive, and he seems not to recognize how implausible it is to
ascribe that vision to the four- and five-year-olds who enjoy the story.
Lawrence's interpretation of his second personal incident is equally off
the mark. When a white liberal friend at Haverford College, a Quaker
institution, in the early 1960's confided that he did not think of Lawrence
as a Negro, Lawrence interpreted this as a grossly insensitive and obtuse
attempt at a compliment, evincing unconscious racism.6' Lawrence might
have objected to the remark on the grounds that being a Negro was an
essential part of his identity and that his friend, in failing to see him as
such, was not seeing him at all. If that was Lawrence's objection,
however, it would have been to something other than racism, unless the
word is to be stretched beyond all recognition to include what is more
nearly its opposite, i.e., the failure to recognize race as a significant social
characteristic.
But we need not be excessively troubled by such a possible
interpretation, because Professor Lawrence's objection is rooted in a more
explicitly invidious interpretation. He believes that the unconscious
message embedded in his classmate's remark was, "'I think of you as
different from other Negroes, as more like [a] white [person],"'68 and
that to "be thought of as a Negro is to be thought of as less than

human. "9o
Of course multiple meanings can be attributed to any statement, but
some are more natural and consistent than others. Given the era and place
in which these words were spoken and the education, motivation, and
probable intelligence of the speaker, Lawrence's interpretation though
possible, is both extremely ungenerous and highly implausible. A more
generous and consistent interpretation is that his friend had chosen a
shorthand way of saying:
We live in a race-charged time and place in which people of other
races are reduced to objects. Our friendship has allowed me to
overcome that. I am no longer forced to see you through the
distorting and collapsing prism of race. To me you have become
a subject and not an object.

67. Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 5, at 318.
68. Id. at 341.
69. Id. at 318.
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If Lawrence's friend was confessing to seeing most Negroes as objects
rather than subjects, he was admitting to a subtly different and, perhaps,
more serious failing than merely reducing people to stereotypes. His friend
had failed to recognize the subjectivity, not merely the individuality, of
Negroes. To the extent that Lawrence's friend was confessing to
stereotyping most Negroes, is it obvious, or even likely, that those
stereotypes were pejorative? To many racial liberals, in the early 1960s
in particular, Negroes appeared noble and heroic. Nor was this generous
stereotype unique to that era. In 1916, Carter G. Woodson, the founder
of The Journalof Negro History, wrote in its inaugural issue that much of
the then current literature on Negroes portrayed them as "persecuted

saint[s].

"70

G. Personal Voice Once More
I have spent some time discussing what is the bare introduction of an
otherwise stylistically standard law-review article to clarify the appropriate
rhetorical standing of the personal voice in legal scholarship. The personal
voice, whether that of Whites, Blacks, men, women, other species, or
beings from another planet, seems to have two related uses. One is
thoroughly legitimate, the other somewhat problematic. The first is to give
a tangible sense to the reader of the meaning of various social and legal
facts. The second is to grant the author some special standing as a
consequence of his recitation of his experience.
The effort to add a personal touch to legal scholarship is, in general,
all to the good. Most legal manuscripts are so arid as to defy digestion.
Providing context and meaning through personal experience when carried
off successfully is admirable and valuable. Does the evocative personal
experience also generate authority for the author? Yes, but this increase
in authority is secondary to, derivative of, and somewhat inconsistent
with, the primary rhetorical use of personal experience.
Our law is about and for human beings. While a good mathematician
may be an immature and disturbed savant, a good legal scholar may not.
Those who propose to tell us something normatively important about law
should have an insight into what people are about. That is why the
personal experience that rings true *and captures a salient social or
psychological fact may add a measure of authority. Had Professor
Lawrence's account and interpretation of his experience demonstrated a
particularly powerful insight into human consciousness, his work would
be valued on that account alone. Even if such an insight is not law or legal
scholarship, it surely informs law. Further, had Lawrence displayed such
70. Winston, supra note 37, at 693 (quoting from volume 1 of the J. NEGRO
HISTORY).
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an insight, he would thereby have placed himself within the class of
people whose other thoughts on the subject should be given a respectful
hearing for they would be offered by a man of some demonstrated wisdom
and understanding.
Note though that the use of personal experience to gain authority is by
its very nature a high-risk proposition; there is more to lose from failure
than to gain from success. The recitation of personal experience that
successfully enables the reader to empathize with the author is a twoedged sword. On the one hand, it demonstrates that the author has some
insight and wisdom. On the other hand, to the extent that it successfully
educates the reader, it partially undercuts the author's privileged position
as a uniquely informed expert. If, however, the author's recitation of his
personal experience does not ring true, or his interpretation is
unpersuasive, not only does the recitation not add authority to the work,
it diminishes the authority it would otherwise have. In Irofessor
Lawrence's case, his interpretation of his experiences with Little Black
Sambo and a college friend are thoroughly unpersuasive and thus can
convey no new insight into race-relations law, or at least not the ones he
would wish. His examples tell far more about the demons in his own
mind-demons that are arguably the product of the hideous history of
race-relations in this country-than they do about the unconscious racism
of others.
III. CONCLUSION

What can we make of this dispute between Professor Kennedy and his
target/critics? It is certainly not about the legitimacy of the use of either
the personal voice or allegory. Nowhere in his article does Professor
Kennedy comment on or criticize either rhetorical device. It is poor
scholarship and seriously flawed arguments that are the object of
Kennedy's wrath. The issue of the use of alternative rhetorical devices is
merely an invention of Wiener, Delgado, Bell, and Williams. 7 At most,
Kennedy's article may be read to refer to, and to criticize, these devices
selectively and by implication. They are to be condemned only when
inartfully employed or illegitimately used to occupy a privileged and
exclusive position on account of one's personal experience.
There is nothing analytically overpowering or even counter-intuitive
in either Professor Kennedy's thesis or presentation. His article is merely
a yery thorough, scholarly, well-argued, and well-written essay. It is
written in the only "voice" that ultimately matters in legal literature, that
of the reasonable and articulate scholar. That is enough to sharply
distinguish it from the works that it criticizes. While Professor Kennedy's
71. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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article stands on its own as a valuable contribution to the legal literature,
the final irony of this debate is that if anyone legitimately uses his or her
personal background to successfully enhance his or her scholarly writing,
it is not the practitioners of minority jurisprudence, but rather Professor
Kennedy himself. Because he is a black scholar with an established record
as a supporter of standard black legal claims, the arguments he offers
cannot be dismissed as racially or ideologically motivated. Let us hope
that Professor Kennedy's example will encourage others in the profession
to distinguish publicly between sense and nonsense.

